

# Package ‘eiCircles’

March 18, 2026

**Type** Package

**Title** Ecological Inference of RxC Tables by Overdispersed-Multinomial Models

**Version** 0.0.1-14

**Description** Estimates RxC (R by C) vote transfer matrices (ecological contingency tables) from aggregate data using the model described in Forcina et al. (2012), as extension of the model proposed in Brown and Payne (1986). Allows incorporation of covariates.

References:

Brown, P. and Payne, C. (1986). "Aggregate data, ecological regression and voting transitions". *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81, 453–460. <[DOI:10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290](https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290)>.

Forcina, A., Gnaldi, M. and Bracalente, B. (2012). "A revised Brown and Payne model of voting behaviour applied to the 2009 elections in Italy". *Statistical Methods & Applications*, 21, 109–119. <[DOI:10.1007/s10260-011-0184-x](https://doi.org/10.1007/s10260-011-0184-x)>.

Pavia, J.M. and Forcina, A. (2026). "Simulating electoral behavior". *Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence, MDAI 2025. Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, vol 15957, Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., Domingo-Ferrer, J. (eds), Springer, Cham, pp. 54-65. <[DOI:10.1007/978-3-032-00891-6\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-00891-6_5)>.

Acknowledgements:

The authors wish to thank Consellería de Educación, Cultura, Universidades y Empleo, Generalitat Valenciana (grant CIAICO/2023/031) and MI-CIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER, EU (grant PID2021-128228NB-I00) for supporting this research.

**License** GPL (>= 2)

**Encoding** UTF-8

**Imports** stats, NlcOptim (>= 0.6)

**Suggests** ggplot2, scales

**RoxygenNote** 7.2.3

**NeedsCompilation** no

**Author** Antonio Forcina [aut] (ORCID: <<https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5239-5495>>),  
Jose M. Pavía [aut, cre] (ORCID:  
<<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0129-726X>>)

**Maintainer** Jose M. Pavía <jose.m.pavia@uv.es>

Repository CRAN

Date/Publication 2026-03-17 23:50:20 UTC

## Contents

BPF . . . . .	2
plot.BPF . . . . .	9
print.BPF . . . . .	11
print.summary.BPF . . . . .	12
simula_BPF . . . . .	12
simula_BPF_with_deviations . . . . .	15
simula_mixture . . . . .	18
summary.BPF . . . . .	25

**Index** **27**

---

BPF *Ecological Inference of RxC Tables by Overdispersed-Multinomial Models*

---

## Description

Implements the model proposed in Forcina et al. (2012), as extension of Brown and Payne (1986), to estimate RxC vote transfer matrices (ecological contingency tables). Allows incorporation of covariates.

## Usage

```
BPF(
  X,
  Y,
  local = "IPF",
  covariates = NULL,
  census.changes = "adjust1",
  stable.units = TRUE,
  stability.par = 0.12,
  confidence = 0.95,
  cs = 50,
  null.cells = NULL,
  row.cells.relationships = NULL,
  row.cells.relationships.C = NULL,
  pair.cells.relationships = NULL,
  cells.fixed.logit = NULL,
  dispersion.rows = data.frame(row1 = rep(1L, ncol(X) - 1L), row2 = 2:ncol(X)),
  start.values = NULL,
  seed = NULL,
  max.iter = 100,
```

```

max.iter.hyper = 1000,
tol = 1e-04,
verbose = FALSE,
save.beta = FALSE,
...
)

```

### Arguments

X	matrix (or data.frame) of order KxR with either the electoral results recorded in election 1 or the sum across columns (the margins of row options) of the K ecological tables.
Y	matrix (or data.frame) of order KxC with either the electoral results recorded in election 2 or the sum across rows (the margins of column options) of the K ecological tables.
local	A character string indicating the algorithm to be used for adjusting the estimates of the transition probabilities obtained for the whole area (electoral space) with the actual observations available in each local unit. Only "IPF" (iterative proportional fitting, also known as raking), "lik" (an algorithm based on the assumed likelihood), "hyper" (an algorithm based on assuming a multi-hypergeometric distribution for the inner values of the unit table given the observed row and column margins, which should be integers; even after census adjustments, if this is necessary) and "none" are allowed. When local = "none", no local estimates are obtained. Default, "IPF"
covariates	A list with two components, covar and meta. covar is a matrix (or data.frame), of order KxNC (where K is the number of (polling) units and NC the number of covariates), with the values of the covariate(s) in each unit. meta is a matrix (or data.frame) with three columns. The data in these columns inform about the cell(s) (row and column) and covariate(s) that should be employed for modelling probabilities in each cell. Cell(s) and covariate(s) could be identified by position or names. For instance, (2, 3, "income") means that the covariate identified as "income" in the object covar should be used as covariate to model the probability corresponding to cell (2, 3) of the transfer (transition probability) matrix. Equally, ("party1", "party2", 4) means that the covariate located in the fourth column of meta should be used to model the transfer probability from "party1" to "party2", where "party1" (in X) and "party2" (in Y) are names used to identified columns in the election data objects. Default, NULL: no covariates are used.
census.changes	A string character indicating how census changes between elections must be handled. At the moment, it only admits two values "adjust1" and "adjust2", where the distributions of votes in election 1 or 2 are, respectively, adjusted to match the outcomes of the other election: "adjust1" adjusts the census of the first election to match that of the second one; "adjust2" adjusts the census of the second election to match that of the first one. Default, "adjust1".
stable.units	A TRUE/FALSE character indicating whether only stable units (those whose number of total number of voters have experienced a small change) are selected. Default, TRUE.

<code>stability.par</code>	A non-negative number that controls the maximum proportion of relative change in the total census for a unit to be considered stable. Default, 0.12. The relative change is measured as the absolute value of the difference of the logarithms of the sizes (censuses) in the two elections. Measuring the relative change this way avoids dependence on which election is used as reference.
<code>confidence</code>	A number between 0 and 1 to be used as level of confidence for the confidence intervals of the transition probabilities (TP estimates). Default, 0.95.
<code>cs</code>	A positive number indicating the average number of cluster size. Default, 50.
<code>null.cells</code>	A matrix (or data.frame) with two columns (row, column) informing about the cells whose probabilities should be constrained to be zero. Cells could be identified by position or names. For instance, (2, 3) means that the probability corresponding to cell (2, 3) of the transfer matrix should be constrained to be zero. Equally, ("party1", "party2") means that the transfer probability from "party1" (in X) to "party2" (in Y) will be zero, where "party1" and "party2" are names used to identified columns in the election data objects. Because the model takes the last option of Y as reference, constraints of this kind cannot be defined involving a cell of the reference category. See <a href="#">Note</a> and <a href="#">Details</a> for more information about constraints and how properly define them. Default, NULL: no null constraints.
<code>row.cells.relationships</code>	A matrix (or data.frame) with four columns (row, column1, column2, constant) may be used to assign a pre-specified value to the ratio between the transition probabilities of two cells within the same row. Because the model takes the value in column2 as reference to define this constraint, column1 and column2 must be different from the last column which has already been used to define the logits. Rows and columns could be identified by position or names. For instance, (2, 3, 5, 0.5) means that the probability corresponding to cell (2, 3) of the transfer matrix is constrained to be equal to 0.5 times the probability corresponding to cell (2, 5) of the transfer matrix. Because each cell defined by (row, column2) is used as reference relative to the corresponding cell (row, column1), it is removed and thus that cell cannot be reference within two different constraints. So, constraints involving the same cell should be defined with care. To be specific, the cells defined by (row, columns2) should not appear in other constraints. For instance, if in the i-th row you want constrain (cell 3) = (cell 1) x 0.6 and (cell 3) = (cell 2) x 0.3 you need to specify it as (cell 3) = (cell 1) x 0.6 and as (cell 2) = (cell 1) x 2. See <a href="#">Note</a> and <a href="#">Details</a> for more information about constraints and how properly define them.. Default, NULL: no row-cell constraints.
<code>row.cells.relationships.C</code>	A matrix (or data.frame) with three columns (row, column, constant) informing about the analog to the constraints described in <code>row.cells.relationships</code> when 'column2' refers to the reference category (C-th column in Y). This is needed because logits are already computed with reference to column C, constraining these ratios is equivalent to assign a specified value to the logit in the corresponding cell. Rows and columns could be identified by position or names. For instance, (2, 3, 0.5) means that the probability corresponding to cell (2, 3) of the transfer matrix is constrained to be equal to 0.5 times the probability corresponding to cell (2, ncol(Y)) of the transfer matrix. See <a href="#">Note</a> and <a href="#">Details</a>

for more information about constraints and how properly define them. Default, NULL: no row-proportional constraints.

`pair.cells.relationships`

This is a kind of less stringent version of the argument `row.cells.relationships`. Both may be used to increase or decrease a transition which is expected to be too different from informed expectations. This argument is declared via a matrix (or `data.frame`) with seven columns (`row1`, `column1.1`, `column1.2`, `row2`, `column2.1`, `column2.2`, `constant`) which imposes proportional relationships between ratios of probabilities corresponding to `row1` and `row2`. Let  $r1$  be the ratio between the probabilities in columns 1.1 and 1.2 in row 1,  $r1 = \text{cell}(\text{row1}, \text{column1.1})/\text{cell}(\text{row1}, \text{column1.2})$ , and  $r2$  the equivalent ratio between probabilities in columns 2.1 and 2.2 in row2,  $r2 = \text{cell}(\text{row2}, \text{column2.1})/\text{cell}(\text{row2}, \text{column2.2})$ , then this argument is used to assign the specified value 'constant' to  $r2/r1$ . Rows and columns could be identified by position or names. For instance, (2, 3, 5, 3, 4, 2, 0.5) means that the ratio of probabilities corresponding to cells (2, 3) and (2, 5) of the transfer matrix is constrained to be equal to 0.5 times the ratio of probabilities corresponding to cells (3, 4) and (3, 2) of the transfer matrix. See Note and Details for more information about constraints and how properly define them. Default, NULL: no ratio-proportional constraints.

`cells.fixed.logit`

A matrix (or `data.frame`) with three columns (`row`, `column`, `number`) informing about the cells with fixed values for the logit of the probability corresponding to the cell; this does not set the actual transition but its ratio with respect to the reference category. For instance, (2, 3, -5) means that the logit of the probability corresponding to cell (2, 3) of the transfer matrix is constrained to be -5. See Note and Details for more information about constraints and how properly define them. Default, NULL: no logit constraints.

`dispersion.rows`

A matrix (or `data.frame`) with two columns (`row1`, `row2`) indicating what pair of two rows should have equal overdispersions. Default, over-dispersions are assumed to be the same in all rows: `data.frame("row1" = rep(1L, ncol(X) - 1L), "row2" = 2:ncol(X))`. See Note and Details for more information about constraints and how properly define them. Use `dispersion.rows = NULL` to specify that overdispersion is unconstrained, i.e., that each row has a different parameter.

`start.values`

A vector of length  $\text{ncol}(X) * \text{ncol}(Y) + \text{nrow}(\text{meta}) - \text{NR}$ , where  $\text{nrow}(\text{meta})$  accounts for the number of regression coefficients and NR is the number of restrictions imposed to either cell probabilities of the transition matrix or overdispersions through the arguments `cells.fixed.logit`, `row.cells.relationships`, `null.cells`, `row.cells.relationships.C`, `pair.cells.relationships` and `dispersion.rows`, with the initial estimates for (i) the logits of the transition matrix probabilities, taking the last column of Y as reference, (ii) the overdispersions (in the logit scale) and (iii) the coefficients in the regression models defined via `covariates`. Typically, this is a beta vector obtained from a previous run of BPF with the same specified model, but which abruptly stopped because of a break in the converging process (see the `save.beta` argument). Default, NULL. When `start = NULL` random initial values for the transition probabilities are generated assuming independence between origin and destination options

	(i.e., implying that transition probabilities are constant across rows), sound values for the over-dispersion parameters are generated and zero coefficients are assumed for the predictors of the regression models.
<code>seed</code>	A number indicating the random seed to be used. Default, NULL: no seed is used.
<code>max.iter</code>	Integer positive number. Maximum number of iterations to be performed for the Fisher scoring algorithm during the MLE estimation. Default, 100.
<code>max.iter.hyper</code>	Integer positive number. Maximum number of iterations without change to be performed for search of the MLE estimate in each unit table when <code>local = "hyper"</code> . Default, 1000.
<code>tol</code>	Maximum value allowed for the numerical estimates of the partial derivatives of the likelihood in the point of convergence. Default, 0.0001.
<code>verbose</code>	A TRUE/FALSE character indicating whether intermediate results should be printed in the screen during the convergence process. Default FALSE.
<code>save.beta</code>	A TRUE/FALSE character indicating whether, while convergence is performed, the vector of temporary logits, over-dispersion (in logit scale) parameters and (if required) regression coefficients should be saved in the working directory in the file "beta.Rdata" file. This data could be used to restart the process in case of a premature failure of convergence process. Default FALSE.
<code>...</code>	Other arguments to be passed to the function. Not currently used.

## Details

Description about how **defining constraints** in more detail.

To define constraints properly is a little tricky. Clearly, in the first place, it is the responsibility of the user to define constraints that are mutually compatible among themselves. The function does not check them to be jointly congruent. It is important to be aware that each linear constraint, when implemented, requires an element of the vector of internal parameters to be set to a known value and the corresponding element of the (underlying) design matrix to be removed. In addition, certain constraints are implemented by replacing one or more columns of the design matrix by suitable linear combinations of the columns that correspond to the cells involved in the constraint. A warning will be issued when two or more constraints require to remove the same column of the design matrix. To avoid conflicting constraints, a safe rule is that each constraint should be acting on disjoint sets of cells.

For each type of constraint, below we specify which column of the design matrix is removed and when a linear combination is needed how it is defined. Note that, in the unconstrained model, the design matrix has a column for each cell of the transition probabilities listed by row except for the last column which is used as reference:

- `null.cells`: The column of the design matrix corresponding to the cell defined by 'row' and 'column' declared when defining the constraint is removed.
- `row.cells.relationships`: The column of the design matrix corresponding to the cell (row, column2) is removed while the one corresponding to the cell (row, column2) is adjusted.
- `row.cells.relationships.C`: The column of the design matrix corresponding to the cell determined by each pair 'row', 'column' is removed.
- `pair.cells.relationships`: This constraint is defined by 4 pairs of "row, column"; the column of the design matrix corresponding to the last pair (row2, column2.2) will be removed and the others adjusted.

**Value**

A list with the following components

TM	The estimated RxC table (matrix) of transition probabilities/rates. This coincides with TP when <code>local = "none"</code> and is equal to TR when <code>local = "IPF"</code> , <code>local = "hyper"</code> or <code>local = "lik"</code> .
TM.votes	The estimated RxC table (matrix) of votes corresponding to TM.
TP	The estimated RxC table (matrix) of underlying transition probabilities obtained after applying the approach in Forcina et al. (2012) with the specified model.
TP.units.cov	With covariates an array of order RxCxK with the estimates tables/matrices of transition probabilities corresponding to each unit taking into account the values of the covariates in the unit. Without covariates this object is NULL.
TR	When <code>local = "IPF"</code> , <code>local = "hyper"</code> or <code>local = "lik"</code> , the estimated RxC table/matrix of transition rates obtained as composition of the estimated unit tables/matrices attained after adjusting TP in each polling unit to the unit margins using the iterative proportional fitting algorithm. When <code>local = "none"</code> , this object is NULL.
TR.units	When <code>local = "IPF"</code> , <code>local = "hyper"</code> or <code>local = "lik"</code> , an array of order RxCxK with the tables/matrices of transition rates attained in each unit attained after adjusting TP using the iterative proportional fitting algorithm to the unit margins. When <code>local = "none"</code> , this object is NULL.
TR.votes.units	When <code>local = "IPF"</code> , <code>local = "hyper"</code> or <code>local = "lik"</code> , the array of order RxCxK with the tables/matrices of votes linked to the TR.units array. When <code>local = "none"</code> , this object is NULL.
TP.lower	A matrix of order RxC with the estimated lower limits of the confidence intervals, based on a normal approximation, of the underlying transition probabilities (TP) of the row-standardized vote transitions from election 1 to election 2.
TP.upper	A matrix of order RxC with the estimated upper limits of the confidence intervals, based on a normal approximation, of the underlying transition probabilities (TP) of the row-standardized vote transitions from election 1 to election 2.
beta	The estimated vector of internal parameters (logits) at convergence. The first $R(C-1) - NR$ elements (where NR is the number of restrictions imposed in cell probabilities) are logits of transitions and the last <code>nrow(beta)</code> elements are the regression coefficients in case covariates are present. The over dispersion(s) parameter(s) is (are) in between. Default, just one over-dispersion parameter. In case of non-convergence, if the function is used with <code>save.beta = TRUE</code> , the components of beta from the file "beta.Rdata" may be used to restart the algorithm from where it stopped by introducing them via the <code>start.values</code> argument.
overdispersion	The estimated vector at convergence of internal overdispersion parameters in the scale from 0 to 1.
sd.TP	Estimated standard deviations of the estimated transition probabilities.
sd.beta	The estimated standard errors of the elements of beta.

<code>cov.beta</code>	The estimated covariance matrix of beta. It may be used to compute approximate variances of transformations of the beta parameters, such as transition probabilities.
<code>madis</code>	A vector of length K with discrepancies of individual local units based on the Mahalanobis measure. It is essentially the quadratic discrepancy between observed and estimated votes weighted by the inverse of the estimated variance.
<code>lk</code>	The value of the log-likelihood at convergence.
<code>selected.units</code>	A vector with the indexes corresponding to the units finally selected to estimate the vote transition probability matrix.
<code>iter</code>	An integer number indicating the number of iterations performed before converging or when stopped.
<code>X</code>	Matrix of order KxR with the adjusted electoral results recorded in election 1.
<code>Y</code>	Matrix of order KxC with the adjusted electoral results recorded in election 2.
<code>inputs</code>	A list containing all the objects with the values used as arguments by the function.

### Note

Constraints may be used to force estimates to take values different from those obtained by unconstrained estimation. As such, these tools should be used sparingly and, essentially, to assess whether estimates are substantially (significantly) different from what we would expect or unexpected estimates are only due to random variation. To first order approximation, twice the difference between the unconstrained and the constrained log-likelihood should be distributed as a chi-square with 1 degree of freedom. This allows to test which constraints are in substantial conflict with the data.

### Author(s)

Antonio Forcina, <forcinarosara@gmail.com>

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

### References

Brown, P. and Payne, C. (1986). Aggregate data, ecological regression and voting transitions. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81, 453–460. doi:10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290

Forcina, A., Gnaldi, M. and Bracalente, B. (2012). A revised Brown and Payne model of voting behaviour applied to the 2009 elections in Italy. *Statistical Methods & Applications*, 21, 109–119. doi:10.1007/s102600110184x

### Examples

```
votes1 <- structure(list(P1 = c(16L, 4L, 13L, 6L, 1L, 16L, 6L, 17L, 48L, 14L),
                        P2 = c(8L, 3L, 0L, 5L, 1L, 4L, 7L, 6L, 28L, 8L),
                        P3 = c(38L, 11L, 11L, 3L, 13L, 39L, 14L, 34L, 280L, 84L),
                        P4 = c(66L, 5L, 18L, 39L, 30L, 57L, 35L, 65L, 180L, 78L),
                        P5 = c(14L, 0L, 5L, 2L, 4L, 21L, 6L, 11L, 54L, 9L),
                        P6 = c(8L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 0L, 7L, 7L, 11L, 45L, 17L),
                        P7 = c(7L, 3L, 5L, 2L, 3L, 17L, 7L, 13L, 40L, 8L)),
```

```

                                row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
votes2 <- structure(list(C1 = c(2L, 1L, 2L, 2L, 0L, 4L, 0L, 4L, 19L, 14L),
                          C2 = c(7L, 3L, 1L, 7L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 10L, 21L, 6L),
                          C3 = c(78L, 7L, 28L, 42L, 28L, 84L, 49L, 85L, 260L, 100L),
                          C4 = c(56L, 14L, 20L, 7L, 19L, 54L, 22L, 50L, 330L, 91L),
                          C5 = c(14L, 3L, 6L, 2L, 3L, 14L, 8L, 8L, 45L, 7L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
example <- BPF(votes1, votes2, local = "IPF")$TM

```

---

plot.BPF	<i>Graphical representation of a RxC ecological inference (vote transfer) matrix</i>
----------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---

## Description

Plot method for objects obtained with BPF.

## Usage

```

## S3 method for class 'BPF'
plot(
  x,
  margins = TRUE,
  digits = 2,
  row.names = NULL,
  col.names = NULL,
  size.numbers = 6,
  size.labels = 4,
  size.margins = 6,
  colour.cells = "darkolivegreen3",
  colour.grid = "floralwhite",
  alpha = 0.5,
  which = NULL,
  ...,
  show.plot = TRUE
)

```

## Arguments

x	An object output of the <b>BPF</b> function.
margins	A TRUE/FALSE argument informing whether the margins of the matrix should be displayed. Default, TRUE.
digits	Integer indicating the number of decimal places to be shown. Default, 2.
row.names	Names to be used for the rows of the matrix.
col.names	Names to be used for the columns of the matrix.

size.numbers	A reference number indicating the average font size to be used for the transfer numbers. Default, 6.
size.labels	A number indicating the font size to be used for labels. Default, 4.
size.margins	A number indicating the font size to be used for margin numbers. Default, 6.
colour.cells	Background base colour for cells.
colour.grid	Colour to be used for grid lines.
alpha	A [0,1] number of colour transparency.
which	A vector of integers informing the units for which the aggregate transfer matrix should be plotted. Default, NULL: the global matrix is shown.
...	Other arguments passed on to methods. Not currently used.
show.plot	A TRUE/FALSE value indicating whether the plot should be displayed as a side-effect. By default, TRUE.

**Value**

Invisibly returns the (ggplot) description of the plot, which is a list with components that contain the plot itself, the data, information about the scales, panels etc.

**Note**

ggplot2 is needed to be installed for this function to work.

**Author(s)**

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

**Examples**

```
votes1 <- structure(list(P1 = c(16L, 4L, 13L, 6L, 1L, 16L, 6L, 17L, 48L, 14L),
                        P2 = c(8L, 3L, 0L, 5L, 1L, 4L, 7L, 6L, 28L, 8L),
                        P3 = c(38L, 11L, 11L, 3L, 13L, 39L, 14L, 34L, 280L, 84L),
                        P4 = c(66L, 5L, 18L, 39L, 30L, 57L, 35L, 65L, 180L, 78L),
                        P5 = c(14L, 0L, 5L, 2L, 4L, 21L, 6L, 11L, 54L, 9L),
                        P6 = c(8L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 0L, 7L, 7L, 11L, 45L, 17L),
                        P7 = c(7L, 3L, 5L, 2L, 3L, 17L, 7L, 13L, 40L, 8L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
votes2 <- structure(list(C1 = c(2L, 1L, 2L, 2L, 0L, 4L, 0L, 4L, 19L, 14L),
                        C2 = c(7L, 3L, 1L, 7L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 10L, 21L, 6L),
                        C3 = c(78L, 7L, 28L, 42L, 28L, 84L, 49L, 85L, 260L, 100L),
                        C4 = c(56L, 14L, 20L, 7L, 19L, 54L, 22L, 50L, 330L, 91L),
                        C5 = c(14L, 3L, 6L, 2L, 3L, 14L, 8L, 8L, 45L, 7L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
example <- BPF(votes1, votes2)
p <- plot(example, show.plot = FALSE)
p
```

---

print.BPF	<i>Print a summary of an output of the BPF function</i>
-----------	---------------------------------------------------------

---

**Description**

Print method for objects obtained with the BPF function.

**Usage**

```
## S3 method for class 'BPF'
print(x, ..., margins = TRUE, digits = 2)
```

**Arguments**

x	An object output of the <b>BPF</b> function.
...	Other arguments passed on to methods. Not currently used.
margins	A TRUE/FALSE argument informing if the margins of the transition matrix should be displayed. Default, TRUE.
digits	Integer indicating the number of decimal places to be shown. Default, 2.

**Value**

No return value, called for side effects.

**Author(s)**

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

**Examples**

```
votes1 <- structure(list(P1 = c(16L, 4L, 13L, 6L, 1L, 16L, 6L, 17L, 48L, 14L),
                        P2 = c(8L, 3L, 0L, 5L, 1L, 4L, 7L, 6L, 28L, 8L),
                        P3 = c(38L, 11L, 11L, 3L, 13L, 39L, 14L, 34L, 280L, 84L),
                        P4 = c(66L, 5L, 18L, 39L, 30L, 57L, 35L, 65L, 180L, 78L),
                        P5 = c(14L, 0L, 5L, 2L, 4L, 21L, 6L, 11L, 54L, 9L),
                        P6 = c(8L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 0L, 7L, 7L, 11L, 45L, 17L),
                        P7 = c(7L, 3L, 5L, 2L, 3L, 17L, 7L, 13L, 40L, 8L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
votes2 <- structure(list(C1 = c(2L, 1L, 2L, 2L, 0L, 4L, 0L, 4L, 19L, 14L),
                        C2 = c(7L, 3L, 1L, 7L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 10L, 21L, 6L),
                        C3 = c(78L, 7L, 28L, 42L, 28L, 84L, 49L, 85L, 260L, 100L),
                        C4 = c(56L, 14L, 20L, 7L, 19L, 54L, 22L, 50L, 330L, 91L),
                        C5 = c(14L, 3L, 6L, 2L, 3L, 14L, 8L, 8L, 45L, 7L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
example <- BPF(votes1, votes2, local = "none")
print(example, digits = 1, margins = TRUE)
```

---

```
print.summary.BPF      Print a summary of a summary.BPF object
```

---

**Description**

Print method for summary.BPFC objects

**Usage**

```
## S3 method for class 'summary.BPF'
print(x, ..., margins = TRUE, digits = 2)
```

**Arguments**

x	An summary.BPF class object.
...	Other arguments passed on to methods. Not currently used.
margins	A TRUE/FALSE argument informing if the margins of the transition matrix should be displayed. Default, TRUE.
digits	Integer indicating the number of decimal places to be shown. Default, 2.

**Value**

No return value, called for side effects.

---

```
simula_BPF      Simulate RxC Tables from Overdispersed-Multinomial Models
```

---

**Description**

Generates a set of RxC tables with the joint distribution of voters in two elections according to the model proposed by Forcina et al. (2012), an extension of Brown and Payne (1986), under the assumption that transition probabilities are homogeneous across units. The simulation procedure is detailed in Pavia and Forcina (2026). Results for the first election may be provided by the user or simulated according to the overdispersed multinomial model.

**Usage**

```
simula_BPF(
  n.units,
  TM,
  prop1,
  polling.sizes,
  theta1 = 0.1,
  theta2 = 0.1,
  cs = 50,
```

```

    noise = 0,
    simplify = FALSE,
    ...
)

```

## Arguments

<code>n.units</code>	Either a positive integer, $K$ , indicating the number of polling units to be simulated, or a $K \times R$ data.frame (or matrix) giving the number of votes obtained in election 1 for each of the $R$ options in each of the $K$ units. If <code>n.units</code> is a matrix or data.frame of counts (votes), the values of arguments <code>prop1</code> and <code>theta1</code> are ignored.
<code>TM</code>	A row-standardized $R \times C$ matrix with the underlying global transition probabilities of the simulated elections. If the matrix is not row-standardized, it is internally row-standardized by the function.
<code>prop1</code>	A vector of length $R$ with the initial assumed probabilities of voting (to be simulated) for each of the $R$ competing options in the first election. If the provided vector is not a set of probabilities (i.e., a vector of positive numbers adding to 1), it is internally standardized by the function.
<code>polling.sizes</code>	Either a vector of two components with two positive integer numbers indicating the minimum and maximum number of voters for each unit or a vector of length <code>n.units</code> of positive integer numbers informing about the number of voters in each unit. When <code>polling.sizes</code> is a vector of length two, a number of voters is randomly assigned for each unit using a uniform distribution with parameters the minimum and maximum values included in <code>polling.sizes</code> .
<code>theta1</code>	A number between 0 and 1 used as the overdispersion parameter. This parameter is employed by the underlying Dirichlet distribution, in conjunction with <code>prop1</code> , to randomly generate vectors of probabilities for each unit. These vectors are then used to simulate the results of the first election. The smaller the value of this parameter, the closer the unit-level marginal distributions for the first election are to <code>prop1</code> . Default, $0.1$ .
<code>theta2</code>	Either a single number between 0 and 1 or a vector of length <code>nrow(TM)</code> containing numbers between 0 and 1. The values in <code>theta2</code> serve as overdispersion parameters and are used alongside the row-probability vectors in <code>TM</code> within the underlying Dirichlet distributions. These distributions are employed to generate probability vectors for each combination of unit, cluster, and row, which are then used to simulate vote transfers from the first to the second election. If <code>theta2</code> is a vector, each row is assigned a distinct overdispersion parameter based on its corresponding value. Default, $0.1$ .
<code>cs</code>	A positive number indicating the average number of cluster size. Default, $50$ .
<code>noise</code>	Either a single number between 0 and 1 or a vector of length <code>nrow(TM)</code> containing numbers between 0 and 1. These numbers account for the proportion of causal voters of each origin party (row). These numbers are used to introduce more variability, compared to the BPF model, into the simulations. If <code>noise &gt; 0</code> , a $100 * \text{noise}$ percentage of votes of each row of each unit are randomly assigned among the column parties. Default, $0$ .

simplify	A TRUE/FALSE argument indicating whether the simulated $R \times C \times K$ array of counts by polling unit should be rearranged as a matrix of order $K \times (RC)$ . Default, FALSE.
...	Other arguments to be passed to the function. Not currently used.

**Value**

A list with the following components

votes1	A $K \times R$ matrix with the (simulated) results in each polling unit for the first election.
votes2	A $K \times C$ matrix with the simulated results in each polling unit for the second election.
TM.global	An $R \times C$ matrix with the simulated global transfer matrix of counts.
TM.units	An $R \times C \times K$ array with the simulated transfer matrices of votes by polling unit. If <code>simplify = TRUE</code> , the simulated transfer matrices of votes are returned in a $K \times (RC)$ matrix.
inputs	A list containing all the objects with the values used as arguments by the function.

**Author(s)**

Antonio Forcina, <forcinarosara@gmail.com>

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

**References**

Brown, P. and Payne, C. (1986). Aggregate data, ecological regression and voting transitions. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81, 453–460. doi:10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290

Forcina, A., Gnaldi, M. and Bracalente, B. (2012). A revised Brown and Payne model of voting behaviour applied to the 2009 elections in Italy. *Statistical Methods & Applications*, 21, 109–119. doi:10.1007/s102600110184x

Pavia, J.M, and Forcina, A. (2026). Simulating electoral behavior. In *Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence, MDAI 2025*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15957, Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., Domingo-Ferrer, J. (eds), Springer, Cham, pp. 54-65. doi:10.1007/978303200891-6\_5

**See Also**

[simula\\_BPF\\_with\\_deviations](#) [simula\\_mixture](#)

**Examples**

```
TMg <- matrix(c(0.6, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8),
             byrow = TRUE, nrow = 3)
example <- simula_BPF(n.units = 100, TM = TMg, prop1 = c(0.3, 0.3, 0.4),
                    polling.sizes = c(750, 850))
```

---

 simula\_BPF\_with\_deviations

*Simulate RxC Square Tables with Ecological Fallacy Effects Based on  
Overdispersed-Multinomial Models*

---

## Description

Generates a set of RxC square (RxR) tables with the joint distribution of voters in two elections according to the model proposed by Forcina et al. (2012), an extension of Brown and Payne (1986), under the assumption that transition probabilities are non-homogeneous across units. The simulation procedure, detailed in Pavia and Forcina (2026), models voter behaviour in each unit using a unit-specific transition table. Each transition table is constructed as a mixture of probabilities representing four latent voter types: (i) voters who follow the global transition probabilities of the BPF model; (ii) largely loyal voters; (iii) strategic voters; and (iv) voters whose probability of remaining loyal depends on their party's strength in the unit at the first election.

## Usage

```
simula_BPF_with_deviations(
  n.units,
  TM,
  prop1,
  polling.sizes,
  theta1 = 0.1,
  theta2 = 0.1,
  cs = 50,
  prop.dev = c(0.4, 0.6),
  prop.loyal = matrix(0.34, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units, nrow(n.units)),
    ncol = nrow(TM)),
  prop.strategic = matrix(0.33, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units,
    nrow(n.units)), ncol = nrow(TM)),
  prop.context = matrix(0.33, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units,
    nrow(n.units)), ncol = nrow(TM)),
  par.loyal = 0.95,
  par.strategic = 0.5,
  par.context = 0.5,
  simplify = FALSE,
  ...
)
```

## Arguments

<code>n.units</code>	Either a positive integer, $K$ , indicating the number of polling units to be simulated, or a $K \times R$ data.frame (or matrix) giving the number of votes obtained in election 1 for each of the $R$ options in each of the $K$ units. If <code>n.units</code> is a matrix or data.frame of counts (votes), the values of arguments <code>prop1</code> and <code>theta1</code> are ignored.
----------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TM	A row-standardized $R \times C$ matrix with the underlying global transition probabilities for the Overdispersed-Multinomial Model. If the matrix is not row-standardized, it is internally row-standardized by the function.
prop1	A vector of length $R$ with the initial assumed probabilities of voting (to be simulated) for each of the $R$ competing options in the first election. If the provided vector is not a set of probabilities (i.e., a vector of positive numbers adding to 1), it is internally standardized by the function.
polling.sizes	Either a vector of two components with two positive integer numbers indicating the minimum and maximum number of voters for each unit or a vector of length <code>n.units</code> of positive integer numbers informing about the number of voters in each unit. When <code>polling.sizes</code> is a vector of length two, a number of voters is randomly assigned for each unit using a uniform distribution with parameters the minimum and maximum values included in <code>polling.sizes</code> .
theta1	A number between 0 and 1 used as the overdispersion parameter. This parameter is employed by the underlying Dirichlet distribution, in conjunction with <code>prop1</code> , to randomly generate vectors of probabilities for each unit. These vectors are then used to simulate the results of the first election. The smaller the value of this parameter, the closer the unit-level marginal distributions for the first election are to <code>prop1</code> . Default, $0.1$ .
theta2	Either a single number between 0 and 1 or a vector of length <code>nrow(TM)</code> containing numbers between 0 and 1. The values in <code>theta2</code> serve as overdispersion parameters and are used alongside the row-probability vectors in <code>TM</code> within the underlying Dirichlet distributions. These distributions are employed to generate probability vectors for each combination of unit, cluster, and row, which are then used to simulate vote transfers from the first to the second election. If <code>theta2</code> is a vector, each row is assigned a distinct overdispersion parameter based on its corresponding value. Default, $0.1$ .
cs	A positive number indicating the average number of cluster size. Default, $50$ .
prop.dev	Either a two-component vector with positive values between 0 and 1, indicating the minimum and maximum proportion of voters (to be simulated) that deviate from the base Overdispersed-Multinomial Model in each unit or a vector of length <code>n.units</code> specifying the proportion of voters deviating from the basic model in each unit. If <code>prop.dev</code> is a two-component vector, the proportion of deviating voters in each unit is randomly assigned using a uniform distribution with the specified minimum and maximum values. Default, <code>c(0.4, 0.6)</code> .
prop.loyal	A $K \times R$ matrix where each cell $(k, r)$ represents the proportion of voters from party $r$ in unit $k$ who are strongly loyal. These voters are highly likely to vote for the same party with near certainty (see the parameter <code>par.loyal</code> ). In contrast, the remaining <code>prop.dev</code> percent of the voters from the party follow the transition probabilities specified in <code>TM</code> . The sum of the matrices <code>prop.loyal</code> , <code>prop.strategic</code> , and <code>prop.contextual</code> must equal one for each cell. If this condition is not met, the function internally standardizes the provided matrices. Default, <code>matrix(0.34, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units, nrow(n.units)), ncol = nrow(TM))</code> .
prop.strategic	A $K \times R$ matrix where each cell $(k, r)$ represents the proportion of voters from party $r$ in unit $k$ who are strategic voters. These voters are a <code>par.strategic</code>

percent more likely to support parties that improve their results in the second election compared to their performance in their first election (see the parameter `par.strategic`). In contrast, the remaining `prop.dev` percent of the voters from the party follow the transition probabilities specified in `TM`. The sum of the matrices `prop.loyal`, `prop.strategic`, and `prop.contextual` must equal one for each cell. If this condition is not met, the function internally standardizes the provided matrices. Default, `matrix(0.33, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units, nrow(n.units)), ncol = nrow(TM))`.

<code>prop.context</code>	A $K \times R$ matrix where each cell ( $k, r$ ) represents the proportion of voters from party $r$ in unit $k$ who are influenced by the relative strength in their neighborhood of the party they voted for in the first election. These voters are a <code>par.context</code> multiplied by the party's strength in the unit percent more likely to support the same party in the second election (see the parameter <code>par.context</code> ). In contrast, the remaining <code>prop.dev</code> percent of the voters from the party follow the transition probabilities specified in <code>TM</code> . The sum of the matrices <code>prop.loyal</code> , <code>prop.strategic</code> , and <code>prop.contextual</code> must equal one for each cell. If this condition is not met, the function internally standardizes the provided matrices. Default, <code>matrix(0.33, nrow = ifelse(is.null(dim(n.units)), n.units, nrow(n.units)), ncol = nrow(TM))</code> .
<code>par.loyal</code>	A number between 0.9 and 1 indicating the minimum probability with which loyal voters will support the same party in the second election as they did in the first. For each unit, the probability is randomly chosen between <code>par.loyal</code> and 1. Default, 0.95.
<code>par.strategic</code>	A positive number indicating the proportion of increase that the initial transfer probabilities in <code>TM</code> should be increased for those parties improving their support in the second election compared to their performance in their first election. Default, 0.5.
<code>par.context</code>	A positive number indicating the factor by which the proportion of support for a party in each unit should be multiplied to increase the initial transfer probabilities in <code>TM</code> corresponding to that party. Default, 0.5.
<code>simplify</code>	A TRUE/FALSE argument indicating whether the simulated $R \times C \times K$ array of counts by polling unit should be rearranged as a matrix of order $K \times (RC)$ . Default, FALSE.
...	Other arguments to be passed to the function. Not currently used.

**Value**

A list with the following components

<code>votes1</code>	A $K \times R$ matrix with the (simulated) results in each polling unit for the first election.
<code>votes2</code>	A $K \times C$ matrix with the simulated results in each polling unit for the second election.
<code>TM.global</code>	An $R \times C$ matrix with the simulated global transfer matrix of counts.
<code>TM.units</code>	An $R \times C \times K$ array with the simulated transfer matrices of votes by polling unit. If <code>simplify = TRUE</code> , the simulated transfer matrices of votes are returned in a $K \times (RC)$ matrix.

inputs            A list containing all the objects with the values used as arguments by the function.

### Note

Compared with `simula_mixture`, this function (i) is restricted to square matrices; (ii) considers only four voter types; and (iii) because it mixes only the expected behaviours across voter types, draws from a distribution with smaller variance, even when the latent types and their parameters are the same.

### Author(s)

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

Antonio Forcina, <forcinarosara@gmail.com>

### References

Brown, P. and Payne, C. (1986). Aggregate data, ecological regression and voting transitions. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81, 453–460. doi:10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290

Forcina, A., Gnaldi, M. and Bracalente, B. (2012). A revised Brown and Payne model of voting behaviour applied to the 2009 elections in Italy. *Statistical Methods & Applications*, 21, 109–119. doi:10.1007/s102600110184x

Pavia, J.M, and Forcina, A. (2026). Simulating electoral behavior. In *Modeling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence, MDAI 2025*. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 15957, Torra, V., Narukawa, Y., Domingo-Ferrer, J. (eds), Springer, Cham, pp. 54-65. doi:10.1007/978303200891-6\_5

### See Also

[simula\\_BPF](#) [simula\\_mixture](#)

### Examples

```
TMg <- matrix(c(0.6, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8),
              byrow = TRUE, nrow = 3)
example <- simula_BPF_with_deviations(n.units = 100, TM = TMg, prop1 = c(0.3, 0.3, 0.4),
                                     polling.sizes = c(750, 850))
```

---

simula\_mixture

*Simulate RxC Tables with Mixed Electoral Behaviours Using Overdispersed Multinomial Models*

---

## Description

Generates a set of RxC electoral contingency tables under a mixture of voting behaviours, including ecological fallacy effects, within the Overdispersed Multinomial model framework proposed by Forcina et al. (2012), an extension of Brown and Payne (1986). The simulated tables represent the joint distribution of voters in two elections across a set of voting units. Each table is generated using a mixture model that incorporates seven latent voter types, where, consistent with the tradition of mixture models, the number of voters of each type in every unit is assumed to follow a multinomial distribution. The seven electoral behaviours considered (ordinary, faithful, trendy, local retrospective strategic, global retrospective strategic, (global) strategic, and economic voters) are specified in the function's arguments and in **Details**.

## Usage

```
simula_mixture(
  n.units,
  TP,
  prop1,
  polling.sizes,
  theta1 = 0.1,
  theta2 = 0.1,
  cs = 50,
  tau,
  TP.f,
  TP.t,
  LRSV.par,
  GRSV.par,
  GSV.par,
  eco.par,
  simplify = FALSE,
  ...
)
```

## Arguments

n.units	Either a positive integer, K, indicating the number of polling units to be simulated, or a KxR data.frame (or matrix) giving the number of votes obtained in election 1 for each of the R options in each of the K units. If n.units is a matrix or data.frame of counts (votes) the values of arguments prop1 and theta1 are ignored.
TP	A RxC row-standardized matrix of global transition probabilities for the Overdispersed Multinomial model (ordinary voters). If not row-standardized, rows are internally normalized. The row-standardized matrix is represented as $\mathbf{P} = [p_{rc}] = [\mathbf{p}_r^T]$ .
prop1	A vector of length R with the initial assumed probabilities of voting (to be simulated) for each of the R competing options in the first election. If the provided vector is not a set of probabilities (i.e., a vector of positive numbers adding to 1), it is internally standardized by the function.

polling.sizes	Either a vector of two components with two positive integer numbers indicating the minimum and maximum number of voters for each unit or a vector of length $n.units$ of positive integer numbers informing about the number of voters in each unit. When <code>polling.sizes</code> is a vector of length two, a number of voters is randomly assigned for each unit using a uniform distribution with parameters the minimum and maximum values included in <code>polling.sizes</code> .
theta1	A number between 0 and 1 used as the overdispersion parameter. This parameter is employed by the underlying Dirichlet distribution, in conjunction with <code>prop1</code> , to randomly generate vectors of probabilities for each unit. These vectors are then used to simulate the results of the first election. The smaller the value of this parameter, the closer the unit-level marginal distributions for the first election are to <code>prop1</code> . Default, $0.1$ .
theta2	Either a single number between 0 and 1 or a vector of length <code>nrow(TP)</code> containing numbers between 0 and 1. The values in <code>theta2</code> serve as overdispersion parameters and are used alongside the row-probability vectors in <code>TP</code> within the underlying Dirichlet distributions. These distributions are employed to generate probability vectors for each combination of unit, cluster, and row, which are then used to simulate vote transfers from the first to the second election. If <code>theta2</code> is a vector, each row is assigned a distinct overdispersion parameter based on its corresponding value. Default, $0.1$ .
cs	A positive number indicating the average number of cluster size. Default, $50$ .
tau	An $R \times 7$ row-standardized matrix with, by rows ( $r$ ), the vectors of probabilities of the multinomial distributions used to simulate, in each polling unit, the number of voters by behaviour type among those who chose option $r$ in the first election. Each cell ( $r, t$ ) defines the probability that a voter who chose option $r$ in the first election behaves as type $t$ in the second election. Probabilities corresponding to electoral behaviours are, by columns, in the order: ordinary, faithful, trendy, local retrospective strategic, global retrospective strategic, (global) strategic, and economic voters. If not row-standardized, rows are internally normalized. The row-standardized matrix is represented as $\Theta = [\tau_{rt}] = [\tau_r^T]$ . By default, $\tau_r = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]$ , i.e., all voters are assumed to behave as ordinary voters.
TP.f	A $R \times C$ row-standardized matrix of transition probabilities for faithful (strongly party-identified) voters, who will vote for the same party again with (almost) probability 1. The matrix is represented as $\mathbf{F} = [f_r^T]$ . By default, it is (initially) the rectangular identity matrix of size $R \times C$ (i.e., $\mathbf{F} = \mathbf{I}_{R \times C}$ , where $(\mathbf{I}_{R \times C})_{rc} = 1$ if $r = c \leq \min(R, C)$ and 0 otherwise), assuming the same order for the intersecting options in the first and second elections. If the same voting options are available in both elections, this will by default be the identity matrix. If an entire row of <code>TP.f</code> consists of zeroes, it is replaced by the corresponding row in <code>TP</code> , so that faithful voters from the first election linked to the row are still transferred to the second.
TP.t	A non-negative vector of length $C$ that sums to 1, representing the transition probabilities for trendy voters. If not standardized, the vector is internally normalized. By default, <code>TP.t = t</code> is the vector of expected results in the second election implied by the matrix <code>TP</code> , assuming that all voters behave as ordinary

voters. Formally, trendy voters behave according to the  $R \times C$  matrix of transition probabilities:  $\mathbf{1}_R \mathbf{t}$ .

LRSV.par	A $4 \times R$ matrix of parameters governing the behaviour of local retrospective strategic voters, who base their decisions on their party's past results in their polling station. The first two rows correspond to minor-party voters and the last two to major-party voters. Within each block, the first row corresponds to proportion thresholds and the second row to beta parameters. Proportion thresholds are non-negative numbers not greater than one, while beta parameters are non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. A party cannot be treated simultaneously as both a minor and a major party. The sign of beta determines the party's size. See <b>Details</b> to understand how the parameters are combined to define transition probabilities for these voters. By default, all beta parameters are set to zero, which is equivalent to assuming that local retrospective strategic voters behave as ordinary voters.
GRSV.par	A $4 \times R$ matrix of parameters governing the behaviour of global retrospective strategic voters, who base their decisions on their party's global past results. The first two rows correspond to minor-party voters and the last two to major-party voters. Within each block, the first row corresponds to proportion thresholds and the second row to beta parameters. Proportion thresholds are non-negative numbers not greater than one, while beta parameters are non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. A party cannot be treated simultaneously as both a minor and a major party. The sign of beta determines the party's size. See <b>Details</b> to understand how the parameters are combined to define transition probabilities for these voters. By default, all beta parameters are set to zero, which is equivalent to assuming that global retrospective strategic voters behave as ordinary voters.
GSV.par	A $4 \times \min(R, C)$ matrix of parameters governing the behaviour of global strategic voters, who base their behaviour on expected results in the second election. It is assumed that the order of parties in the first and second elections coincides for the first $\min(R, C)$ parties (voting options) in both elections. The first two rows correspond to minor-party voters and the last two to major-party voters. Within each block, the first row corresponds to proportion thresholds and the second row to beta parameters. Proportion thresholds are non-negative numbers not greater than one, while beta parameters are non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. A party cannot be treated simultaneously as both a minor and a major party. The sign of beta determines the party's size. See <b>Details</b> to understand how the parameters are combined to define transition probabilities for these voters. By default, all beta parameters are set to zero, which is equivalent to assuming that strategic voters behave as ordinary voters.
eco.par	A list with three vectors governing the behaviour of economic voters. These voters prioritise economic performance, rewarding or punishing parties in the governing coalition based on the perceived local change in the economic situation. The first component is a vector of length $K$ , whose elements capture the (perceived) variation in the economy across voting units, with positive values indicating improvement. The second component is a vector of length $R$ with the non-negative beta parameters that map the scale of economic performance to the logits of transition probabilities for each party. The third component is a vector of length $C$ , with entries equal to one for parties in the second election that were

part of the governing coalition between the first and second elections, and zero otherwise. See **Details** to understand how the parameters are combined to define transition probabilities for these voters. By default, all beta parameters are set to zero, which is equivalent to assuming that economic voters behave as ordinary voters.

simplify A TRUE/FALSE argument indicating whether the simulated RxCxK array of counts by polling unit should be rearranged as a matrix of order Kx(RC). Default, FALSE.

... Other arguments to be passed to the function. Not currently used.

## Details

Description of how parameters for strategic and economic voters are combined.

- **local retrospective strategic voters:** These are voters who consider retrospective outcomes and make tactical decisions to maximize their preferred outcomes, not necessarily their first choice. Their decisions are assumed to depend on the local strength of the party they supported in the previous election. (i) If their party was a minor one, they will support it again when it appears sufficiently strong, or vote for a different option to avoid wasting their vote; (ii) If their party was a major one, they will support it again when it seems to require their support in order to remain strong enough; otherwise, they may choose differently. Formally, let  $\mathbf{f}_r$  denote the  $r$ th row of the matrix  $\mathbf{F}$  for faithful voters, and let  $\lambda_r$  denote the vector of logits  $\log(\mathbf{p}_r/p_{rC})$  based on the matrix of transition probabilities for ordinary voters. The vector of retrospective-strategy-local-modified logits for voting unit  $s$  is defined as  $\lambda_{sr}^{LRS} = \lambda_r + \beta_r(\pi_{sr} - a_r)$ , where  $a_r$  is the threshold for party  $r$ ,  $\pi_{sr}$  is the proportion of votes gained by party  $r$  in voting unit  $s$  in the first election, and  $\beta_r$  is the corresponding mapping parameter, non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. In words,  $\lambda_r$  is the vector of logits for ordinary voters (representing basic preferences),  $\pi_{sr}$  represents the local strength of party  $r$  in unit  $s$ ,  $a_r$  is the threshold parameter that determines the switching point in voter behaviour, and  $\beta_r$  adjusts the degree of strategic consideration. Under this specification, because of the interaction with the difference  $(\pi_{sr} - a_r)$ , a value of  $\beta_r > 0$  makes voters more likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and less likely otherwise, whereas a value of  $\beta_r < 0$  makes voters less likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and more likely otherwise.
- **global retrospective strategic voters:** These voters behave similarly to local retrospective strategic voters, but consider global rather than local results. They take retrospective outcomes into account and make tactical decisions to maximize their preferred outcomes, not necessarily their first choice. Their decisions are assumed to depend on the overall strength of the party they supported in the previous election. (i) If their party was a minor one, they will support it again when it appears sufficiently strong, or vote for a different option to avoid wasting their vote; (ii) If their party was a major one, they will support it again when it seems to require their support in order to remain strong enough; otherwise, they may choose differently. Formally, let  $\mathbf{f}_r$  denote the  $r$ th row of the matrix  $\mathbf{F}$  for faithful voters, and let  $\lambda_r$  denote the vector of logits  $\log(\mathbf{p}_r/p_{rC})$  based on the matrix of transition probabilities for ordinary voters. The vector of retrospective-strategy-global-modified logits is defined as  $\lambda_r^{GRS} = \lambda_r + \beta_r(\pi_r - b_r)$ , where  $b_r$  is the threshold for party  $r$ ,  $\pi_r$  is the total proportion of votes gained by party  $r$  in the first election, and  $\beta_r$  is the corresponding mapping parameter, non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. In words,  $\lambda_r$  is the vector of logits for ordinary voters (representing basic preferences),  $\pi_r$  represents the global strength of party  $r$  in the first election,

$b_r$  is the threshold parameter that determines the switching point in voter behaviour, and  $\beta_r$  adjusts the degree of strategic consideration. Under this specification, because of the interaction with the difference  $(\pi_r - b_r)$ , a value of  $\beta_r > 0$  makes voters more likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and less likely otherwise, whereas a value of  $\beta_r < 0$  makes voters less likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and more likely otherwise.

- **global strategic voters:** These voters behave similarly to global retrospective strategic voters, but base their decisions on expected results in the second election. They consider expected outcomes and make tactical decisions to maximize their preferred outcomes, not necessarily their first choice. Their decisions are assumed to depend on the expected overall strength in the second election of the party they supported in the first election, knowledge that in practice may be obtained from surveys. (i) If their party was a minor one, they will support it again when it appears sufficiently strong, or vote for a different option to avoid wasting their vote; (ii) If their party was a major one, they will support it again when it seems to require their support to remain strong enough; otherwise, they may choose differently. Formally, let  $\mathbf{f}_r$  denote the  $r$ th row of the matrix  $\mathbf{F}$  for faithful voters, and let  $\lambda_r$  denote the vector of logits  $\log(\mathbf{p}_r/p_{rC})$  based on the matrix of transition probabilities for ordinary voters. Assuming the same order of parties in the first and second elections for those parties affected by strategic voters, the vector of strategy-global-modified logits is defined as  $\lambda_r^{GS} = \lambda_r + \beta_r \left( \sum_j \pi_j p_{jr} - c_r \right)$ , where  $c_r$  is the threshold for party  $r$ ,  $\pi_j$  is the total proportion of votes gained by party  $j$  in the first election,  $p_{jr}$  is the transition probability from party  $j$  to party  $r$  for ordinary voters, and  $\beta_r$  is the corresponding transforming parameter, non-negative for minor parties and non-positive for major parties. In words,  $\lambda_r$  is the vector of logits for ordinary voters (representing basic preferences),  $\sum_j \pi_j p_{jr}$  represents the expected global strength of party  $r$  in the second election,  $c_r$  is the threshold parameter that determines the switching point in voter behaviour, and  $\beta_r$  adjusts the degree of strategic consideration. Under this specification, because of the interaction with the difference  $\sum_j (\pi_j p_{jr}) - c_r$ , a value of  $\beta_r > 0$  makes voters more likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and less likely otherwise, whereas a value of  $\beta_r < 0$  makes voters less likely to support their party if it appears sufficiently strong and more likely otherwise.
- **economic voters:** These voters prioritise economic performance, rewarding or punishing parties in the governing coalition based on the perceived change in the local economic situation. Formally, let  $\mathbf{v}_s$  denote the perceived measure of economic variation in unit  $s$ ,  $\lambda_r$  the vector of logits  $\log(\mathbf{p}_r/p_{rC})$  based on the matrix of transition probabilities for ordinary voters, and  $\mathbf{g}$  a vector with entries equal to 1 for parties in the governing coalition and 0 otherwise. The vector of economically modified logits for voting unit  $s$  is then defined as  $\lambda_{sr}^E = \lambda_r + \beta_r \mathbf{v}_s \mathbf{g}$ , with  $\beta_r > 0$  being the mapping parameter. Under this specification, these voters are more likely to support government parties if the local economy improves.

## Value

A list with the following components

votes1	A KxR matrix with the (simulated) results in each polling unit for the first election.
votes2	A KxC matrix with the simulated results in each polling unit for the second election.
TM.global	An RxC matrix with the simulated global transfer matrix of counts.

TM.units	An $R \times C \times K$ array with the simulated transfer matrices of votes by polling unit. If <code>simplify = TRUE</code> , the simulated transfer matrices of votes are returned in a $K \times (RC)$ matrix.
TM.by.behaviour	A list with seven components, each of which is itself a list containing the four simulated elements ( <code>votes1</code> , <code>votes2</code> , <code>TM.global</code> and <code>TM.units</code> as $R \times C \times K$ arrays) corresponding to the subgroups of voters by behaviour, in the following order: ordinary, faithful, trendy, local retrospective strategic, global retrospective strategic, (global) strategic, and economic voters.
inputs	A list containing all the objects with the values used as arguments by the function.

### Note

Compared with `simula_BPF_with_deviations`, this function (i) is not restricted to square matrices; (ii) considers up to seven voter types; and (iii) because it mixes distributions, it draws from a distribution with larger variance, even when the latent types and their parameters are the same.

### Author(s)

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

Antonio Forcina, <forcinarosara@gmail.com>

### References

Brown, P. and Payne, C. (1986). Aggregate data, ecological regression and voting transitions. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81, 453–460. doi:10.1080/01621459.1986.10478290

Forcina, A., Gnaldi, M. and Bracalente, B. (2012). A revised Brown and Payne model of voting behaviour applied to the 2009 elections in Italy. *Statistical Methods & Applications*, 21, 109–119. doi:10.1007/s102600110184x

### See Also

[simula\\_BPF](#) [simula\\_BPF\\_with\\_deviations](#)

### Examples

```
TMg <- matrix(c(0.6, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.7, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8),
             byrow = TRUE, nrow = 3)
example <- simula_mixture(n.units = 100, TP = TMg, prop1 = c(0.3, 0.3, 0.4),
                        polling.sizes = c(750, 850))
```

---

summary.BPF	<i>Summarize a BPF output object</i>
-------------	--------------------------------------

---

**Description**

Summary method for objects obtained with the BPF function

**Usage**

```
## S3 method for class 'BPF'
summary(object, ...)
```

**Arguments**

object	An object output of the <b>BPF</b> function.
...	Other arguments passed on to methods. Not currently used.

**Value**

An object of class "summary.BPF". A list with four components:

prop.matrix	A matrix of order RxC with the estimated underlying proportions/rates of the vote transitions from election 1 to election 2.
counts.matrix	A matrix of order RxC with the estimated vote transfers from election 1 to election 2.
row.margins	A vector of length R with the aggregate observed/adjusted distribution of proportions of votes in election 1.
col.margins	A vector of length C with the aggregate observed/adjusted distribution of proportions of votes in election 2.

**Author(s)**

Jose M. Pavia, <pavia@uv.es>

**Examples**

```
votes1 <- structure(list(P1 = c(16L, 4L, 13L, 6L, 1L, 16L, 6L, 17L, 48L, 14L),
                        P2 = c(8L, 3L, 0L, 5L, 1L, 4L, 7L, 6L, 28L, 8L),
                        P3 = c(38L, 11L, 11L, 3L, 13L, 39L, 14L, 34L, 280L, 84L),
                        P4 = c(66L, 5L, 18L, 39L, 30L, 57L, 35L, 65L, 180L, 78L),
                        P5 = c(14L, 0L, 5L, 2L, 4L, 21L, 6L, 11L, 54L, 9L),
                        P6 = c(8L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 0L, 7L, 7L, 11L, 45L, 17L),
                        P7 = c(7L, 3L, 5L, 2L, 3L, 17L, 7L, 13L, 40L, 8L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
votes2 <- structure(list(C1 = c(2L, 1L, 2L, 2L, 0L, 4L, 0L, 4L, 19L, 14L),
                        C2 = c(7L, 3L, 1L, 7L, 2L, 5L, 3L, 10L, 21L, 6L),
                        C3 = c(78L, 7L, 28L, 42L, 28L, 84L, 49L, 85L, 260L, 100L),
                        C4 = c(56L, 14L, 20L, 7L, 19L, 54L, 22L, 50L, 330L, 91L)),
                    row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")
```

```
      C5 = c(14L, 3L, 6L, 2L, 3L, 14L, 8L, 8L, 45L, 7L)),  
      row.names = c(NA, 10L), class = "data.frame")  
example <- BPF(votes1, votes2, local = "none")  
summary(example)
```

# Index

- \* **ecological inference**
  - overdispersed-multinomial models**
    - BPF, [2](#)
- BPF, [2](#)
- plot.BPF, [9](#)
- print.BPF, [11](#)
- print.summary.BPF, [12](#)
- simula\_BPF, [12](#), [18](#), [24](#)
- simula\_BPF\_with\_deviations, [14](#), [15](#), [24](#)
- simula\_mixture, [14](#), [18](#), [18](#)
- summary.BPF, [25](#)